The global financial crisis has reignited the debate about the risks of financial globalisation, in particular the international transmission of financial shocks. We use data on individual loans by the largest international banks to their various countries of operations to examine whether banks' access to borrower information affected the transmission of the financial shock across borders. The simultaneous use of country and bank-fixed effects allows us to disentangle credit supply and demand and to control for general bank characteristics. We find that during the crisis banks continued to lend more to countries that are geographically close, where they are integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders, and where they had gained experience by building relationships with (repeat) borrowers.
Introduction
In the wake of the 2007-2009 economic crisis, the virtues and vices of financial globalisation are being re-evaluated. Financial linkages between countries, in particular in the form of bank lending, have been singled out as a key channel of international crisis transmission. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the G-20 have identified the volatility of cross-border capital flows as a priority related to the reform of the global financial system (IMF, 2010) . A pertinent question that is high on the policy and academic agenda is why cross-border bank lending to some countries is relatively stable whereas it is more volatile in other cases. The recent crisis, which originated in the US sub-prime market but spilled over to much of the developed and developing world, provides for an ideal testing ground to answer this question.
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, syndicated cross-border lending declined on average by 53 percent compared to pre-crisis levels (Dealogic Loan Analytics). In this paper we hypothesise that cross-border lending was reduced most to countries where banks were unable to limit the increase in uncertainty through generating additional information about borrowers and had to resort to credit rationing instead. We use unique data on lending by international banks to corporate borrowers in a large number of countries to put this theoretical prior to the test and to demonstrate that access to borrower information is a key determinant of lending stability in times of crisis.
The use of micro data allows us to make a significant contribution to the emerging literature on the transmission of the recent crisis. A number of papers use aggregate data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to study the 2008/2009 contraction in international bank lending. They find that international banks contributed to the spreading of the crisis and that this impact was most severe in the case of banking sectors that were vulnerable to US dollar funding shocks (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011) , that displayed a low average level of profitability or high average expected default frequency (McGuire and Tarashev, 2008) , or that had a poor average stock-market performance (Herrmann and Mihaljek, 2010) . Takáts (2010) shows that supply factors -proxied by the volatility of the S&P 500 Financial Indexwere a more important driver of the reduction in lending to emerging markets than local demand. Finally, Hoggarth, Mahadeva and Martin (2010) argue on the basis of aggregate BIS data and information from market participants that the reversal in cross-border credit flows may have been concentrated in banks' 'non-core' or 'peripheral' markets. The authors speculate that banks reduced their exposures in particular to those countries where they knew borrowers less well.
While these papers provide broad insights into the determinants of aggregate bank lending, they do not tell us what type of banks transmitted the crisis to what type of borrowers in what type of countries. It remains unclear whether banks reduced their cross-border lending across the board or only to particular 'non-core' countries. This is not only unfortunate from an academic perspective but also from the point of view of policy-makers who want to gauge international banks' commitment to their country during times of crisis.
An empirical analysis to answer these finer questions needs to be based on bank-level data, ideally on loan flows from individual banks to individual countries over a prolonged period of time. Data should contain lending to various countries from individual banks (to exploit within-bank variation) as well as lending flows from various banks to individual countries (to control for credit demand at the country level). And finally, such data should preferably contain the individual deals that underlie credit flows, so that micro-information on borrowers and on inter-bank cooperation can be exploited. We use data on cross-border syndicated bank lending that fulfil all of these requirements.
Loan syndications -groups of financial institutions that jointly provide a loan to a corporate borrower -are one of the main channels of cross-border debt finance to both developed and emerging markets. 1 In 2007, international syndicated loans made up over 40 percent of all cross-border funding to US borrowers and more than two-thirds of cross-border flows to emerging markets. 2 We concentrate on the 118 largest banks in the cross-border syndicated loan market, which together account for over 90 per cent of this market. We use data on individual cross-border deals to construct, for each of these banks, a monthly snapshot of their credit flows to firms in individual countries. This allows us to compare post-crisis and pre-crisis lending by each bank to each country.
We use regression techniques to explain this lending behaviour through variables that measure the ability of banks to screen and monitor borrowers in particular destination countries. We control for changes in credit demand and other destination country variables by using destination country-fixed effects -in effect analysing how different banks change their lending to the same country differently (within-country comparison). Moreover, we control for bank-specific characteristics by using bank-fixed effects; in effect analysing how a particular bank changes its lending to different countries differently (within-bank comparison) . This combination of country-and bank-fixed effects allows us to narrowly focus on information variables that are specific to particular bank-country pairs and to empirically isolate the impact of these variables on the stability of international lending relationships.
We find that during the global financial crisis banks were better able to keep lending to countries that are geographically close, in which they are well integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders, and in which they had gained experience by building relationships with (repeat) borrowers. For emerging markets, where trustworthy 'hard' information is less readily available and a local presence might be more important, we also find (weak) evidence that the presence of a local subsidiary stabilises cross-border lending. Our analysis shows that information asymmetries between banks and their foreign customers are an important determinant of the resilience of cross-border lending during a crisis. Even in a 'hard information' setting, such as the market for syndicated corporate loans, access to soft information seems to be important. 1 We define emerging markets as all countries except high-income Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Although Slovenia and South Korea were recently reclassified as high-income countries, we still consider them as emerging markets. 2 Cross-border funding is defined as the sum of international syndicated credit, international money market instruments, and international bonds and notes (Bank for International Settlements, Tables 10, 14 a , and 14 b ).
This paper not only contributes to the emerging literature on the transmission of the recent crisis, but also complements a number of studies that analyse financial contagion through international bank lending. Weder (2001, 2003) , for example, find that international banks that are exposed to a financial shock -either in their home or in a third country-reduce lending to other countries. Jeanneau and Micu (2002) show that cross-border lending is determined by macroeconomic factors, such as the business cycle and the monetary policy stance, in both home and host country. Buch, Carstensen and Schertler (2010) analyse the cross-border transmission of shocks and find that interest rate differentials and also energy prices influence international bank lending. This paper goes beyond assessing the impact of macroeconomic factors on international bank lending. We instead test a number of hypotheses on mechanisms that banks use to mitigate information problems that hitherto have not been analysed in an international context.
Our paper is also related to the work of Schnabl (2011) and Aiyar (2010) who focus on the reduction in cross-border lending to Peruvian banks after the 1998 Russian default and to British banks after the 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse, respectively. Both authors find that these external funding shocks forced banks to contract domestic lending. We also focus on the Lehman Brothers collapse as an external liquidity shock, but instead assess how this shock was transmitted across borders to both bank and non-bank borrowers.
In addition, this paper adds to the literature on multinational banking. A number of papers demonstrate that foreign affiliates of multinational banks can act as shock transmitters. Rosengren (1997, 2000) show how the drop in Japanese stock prices in 1990 led Japanese bank branches in the US to reduce credit. Imai and Takarabe (2011) find that Japanese nationwide city banks transmitted local real estate price shocks to other prefectures within Japan as well. In line with this evidence, Allen, Hryckiewicz, Kowalewski and Tümer-Alan (2010), De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) , and Popov and Udell (2010) find that lending by multinational bank subsidiaries depends on the financial strength of the parent bank. Our paper is related to this literature as we compare cross-border lending by banks with and without a subsidiary in a particular destination country. In doing so we connect the literature on the stability of international and multinational bank lending.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on distance and borrower information and derives the theoretical priors that we test in this paper. Section 3 explains our data and econometric methodology, after which Section 4 describes our empirical findings, a set of robustness tests, and extensions of our main results. Section 5 concludes.
Distance, borrower information, and lending stability
There exists by now a substantial theoretical and empirical literature that analyses how banks (try to) overcome agency problems vis-à-vis (potential) customers. Banks screen new borrowers and monitor existing ones to reduce information asymmetries and the agency problems associated with debt (Allen, 1990) . Banks' ability to screen and monitor varies across borrowers: agency problems are more pronounced for opaque and small companies.
Banks need to exercise considerable effort to collect 'soft' information about such borrowers, for instance by building up a lending relationship over time (Rajan, 1992; Ongena, 1999) .
When screening and monitoring is difficult, the scope for adverse selection and moral hazard remains high and banks resort to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . Because opaque borrowers are particularly difficult to screen and monitor they experience more credit rationing than transparent firms (Berger and Udell, 2002) .
Banks' screening and monitoring intensity also varies over time. An adverse economic shock increases the marginal benefits of screening and monitoring as the proportion of firms with a high default probability increases (Ruckes, 2004) .
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During a recession or crisis the net worth of firms drops, adverse selection and moral hazard increase, and banks step up their screening and monitoring (Rajan, 1994 and Udell, 2004) . However, banks face difficulties in offsetting increased agency problems if borrowers are opaque. In response to an adverse shock they therefore resort to credit rationing of such intransparent borrowers in particular ('flight to quality', Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996) . In a similar vein, we expect that during the recent crisis banks reduced cross-border lending the most to countries where they were unable to limit the increase in uncertainty through generating additional borrower information and resorted to credit rationing instead. Economic theory suggests a number of factors that influence whether a bank is able to limit agency problems.
First, we consider the geographical distance between the bank and its borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; . Distant borrowers are more difficult to screen and monitor and banks therefore lend less to far-away clients (Jaffee and Modigliani, 1971; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) . In line with geographical credit rationing, Portes, Rey, and Oh (2001) ; Buch (2005) ;
and Giannetti and Yafeh (2008) document a negative relationship between distance and international asset holdings, including bank loans. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) show how the negative relationship between bank-borrower distance and credit availability is largely due to the inability to collect and make use of 'soft' information. We therefore expect that, in line with an international flight to quality, distant firms were rationed more by international banks during the crisis than less remote companies. That is, we expect a negative relationship between distance and bank lending stability.
A mechanism for banks to overcome distance constraints in cross-border lending is to set up a local subsidiary (Mian, 2006; Giannetti and Yafeh, 2008) . A presence on the ground reduces information asymmetries as local loan officers are better placed to extract soft information from borrowers. Developing closer ties with clients may allow the bank to continue to lend to borrowers during periods of high uncertainty because screening and monitoring can be stepped up quite easily. Local staff on the ground can also make it easier for a bank to generate (and subsequently monitor) new cross-border deals. Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) argue that (small) banks that use soft information may sustain longer relationships with clients because they provide clients with better lending terms, compared to banks that lack access to such information. In a similar vein, we hypothesise that a bank with a subsidiary may find it easier to continue to lend cross-border, since the subsidiary generates (soft) information that allows the bank to refrain from adjusting lending terms too much. Finally, because soft information is not easily transferable across banks, international banks with a local subsidiary may have greater market power over firms than banks without a subsidiary. Firms that are a client of a bank with a local presence may find it more costly to switch to another bank during a crisis and the lending relationship may therefore be more stable.
While a local subsidiary reduces the physical distance between the firm and the loan officer, it also creates 'functional distance' within the bank.
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Banks may experience difficulties in efficiently passing along (soft) information from the subsidiary to headquarters (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Stein, 2002) . Liberti and Mian (2009) show that when the hierarchical distance between the information collecting agent and the officer that ultimately approves a loan is large, less 'soft' or subjective and more 'hard' information is used. If the incentives of subsidiary managers are not aligned with those of the parent bank, internal agency costs (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) may hamper cross-border lending as well. Such costs increase with distance if parent banks find it more difficult to supervise management in far-away places (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000) .
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Whether the presence of a subsidiary makes cross-border lending more stable or not therefore depends on whether the positive effect of the shorter distance between loan officer and borrower is offset by the negative effect of a longer within-bank functional distance.
Another way for banks to overcome distance constraints in cross-border lending is to cooperate with domestic banks. These banks may possess a comparative advantage in reducing information asymmetries vis-à-vis local firms (Mian, 2006; Houston, Itzkowitz, and Naranjo, 2007) , as they share the same language and culture and may have a more intimate knowledge of local legal, accounting, and other institutions and their impact on firms. In line with this, Carey and Nini (2007) find that local bank participation leads to larger, longer, and cheaper syndicated loans. Borrowers may still value the presence of foreign banks if these are part of international bank networks that provide firms with a deeper and more liquid loan base, further reducing borrowing costs (Houston et al., 2007) . By (repeatedly) co-lending with domestic banks, international banks may gradually increase their own knowledge of local firms and reduce information asymmetries. We therefore expect that international banks that are well-integrated in a lending network of domestic banks may find it easier to continue lending during a period of severe financial stress.
Finally, the negative effect of distance on the ability to screen and monitor may become less acute the more experience a bank has built up in lending to certain borrowers. De Haas and Van Horen (2010) find that in the wake of the Lehman collapse agency problems increased less for banks lending to firms, industries, or countries that they had been lending to before.
In line with this, we expect that during the financial crisis banks reduced their lending to a lesser extent to countries where they had built up substantial pre-crisis lending experience. We then use these loan portions to reconstruct the volume and country distribution of individual banks' monthly lending over the sample period. We focus on actual cross-border lending, which we define as loans where the nationality of the (parent) bank is different from the nationality of the borrower and where the loan is provided by the parent (Citibank lending from the United States to a Polish firm), rather than by a subsidiary (Citibank Poland participating in a syndicated loan to a Polish firm). The vast majority (94 per cent) of crossborder lending is of the former type and therefore included in our dataset. We use the percentage change between these post-Lehman and pre-crisis average amounts of cross-border lending as our first dependent variable (Volume). We also construct a dummy variable Sudden stop that is 1 for each bank-country pair where the decline in bank lending during the crisis exceeded 75 per cent. Finally, we create a dependent variable that measures for each destination country the percentage change in the number of syndicates that a lender arranged or participated in (Number).
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To reduce the probability that our results are affected by outliers we exclude observations above the 97 th percentile for Volume and Number. per cent or more in 62 per cent of the countries. Sudden stops were more common in emerging markets (68 per cent) compared to advanced markets (54 per cent). In terms of 7 During our sample period RBS acquired part of ABN Amro; Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch; and Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia. We consider these merged banks as a single entity over our whole sample period. We add the number of loans their respective parts provided during the pre-merger period and calculate other bank-specific variables as weighted averages, using total assets of the pre-merger entities as weights. 8 Note that complete information is available to construct this dependent variable. Even though we only have loan share information for 25 per cent of the sample, we do have the total loan volume and the names of all lenders in each syndicate. So the change in the number of loans of bank i to country j is measured without error.
number of loans, we see that the decline was even sharper than in terms of loan volume, indicating that in particular smaller loans were discontinued during the crisis. We create a number of variables that measure for individual bank-country combinations the ability of banks to mitigate the increase in information costs during the crisis ('Information variables' in Table 1 ). We start with using the great circle distance formula to calculate the geographical distance between each bank's headquarters and its various countries of operations as the number of kilometres between the capitals of both countries. The average distance to a foreign borrower is 4,772 km, but there exists considerable variation (the standard deviation is 3,764 km).
Second, we link each of our banks to Bureau van Dijk's BankScope database, which not only contains information on balance sheets and income statements but also on ownership structure (both of the banks themselves and their minority and majority equity participations).
For each bank we identify all majority-owned foreign bank subsidiaries. We create a dummy variable Subsidiary that is one in each country where a particular bank owns a subsidiary. A typical bank owns a subsidiary in three foreign countries and this means that in about 16 per cent of our bank-country pairs a subsidiary is present.
Third, we count for each bank in each of its countries of operations the number of different domestic banks with which it has cooperated in a syndicate since 2000. We divide this number by the total number of domestic banks that are active in a particular destination country to create the variable Domestic lenders. A better embedding in a network of local banks may allow a bank to become less of an 'outsider' and to 'free-ride' on the ability of local banks to generate information about local borrowers. On average a bank has worked with 15 different domestic banks in a given country, which is 34 per cent of the average number of domestic lenders. Variation is large, however, with some international banks never cooperating with domestic banks, whereas others have cooperated at least once with each domestic bank.
Fourth, we create a variable that measures a bank's prior experience in syndicated bank lending to a specific country. We measure Experience as the number of loans that a bank provided to a particular country since 2000 and that had matured by August 2007 (we exclude still outstanding loans as these are included in the separate variable Exposure). The average number of prior loans is 34 and ranges between 0 and 2,242.
In addition, we create a number of control variables. The first one is Exposure, which measures for each bank-country combination the amount of outstanding syndicated debt as a percentage of the bank's total assets at the time of the Lehman collapse. On average this outstanding exposure was close to 0.5 per cent of the parent bank's balance sheet. We are agnostic about the impact of this variable on the severity of the lending decline. Banks may have adjusted their lending the most to countries where they had relatively high pre-crisis exposures, for instance because risk limits became more binding for such countries. On the other hand, banks may have mainly retrenched from 'marginal', non-core countries while staying put in their core markets (as defined by the pre-crisis portfolio share).
The other control variables are bank-specific and do not vary across destination countries. We only include these in regression specifications without bank fixed effects, in order to learn more about what type of banks reduced their international bank lending the most. We use two variables that control for the pre-crisis (2006) financial strength of each bank. These are Solvency (equity/total assets) and Liquidity (Liquid assets/deposits and other short-term funding). Controlling for banks' pre-crisis financial strength is important as banks with weak balance sheets can be expected to reduce foreign exposures the most (McGuire and Tarashev, 2008; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2010) . We also include these variables as changes over the 2006-2009 period to take into account that banks not only differed in terms of initial conditions but also in terms of how hard they were hit by the financial crisis. Banks differed in particular with regard to their dependence on short-term US dollar liquidity to fund foreign US dollar claims (McGuire and Von Peter, 2009 ).
Finally, we include a dummy variable State support that indicates whether a bank received government support during the crisis. To create this dummy, we develop a database of all financial support measures -capital injections, loan guarantees, and removals of toxic assets -since the onset of the crisis. Thirty per cent of the banks in our sample received some form of official government support and this translates into 47 per cent of the bank-country pairs.
State support can be seen as an indicator of a bank's financial fragility during the crisis and thus as a proxy for the bank's need to deleverage -including through reducing cross-border lending. In addition, Kamil and Rai (2010) suggest that public rescue programmes may also have caused banks to 'accelerate the curtailment of cross-border bank flows'. Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that rescue packages came with strings attached as banks were asked to refocus on domestic lending. For instance, when the UK government decided to guarantee a substantial part of Royal Bank of Scotland's assets, the bank "promised to lend £ 50 billion more in the next two years, expanding its domestic loan book by a fifth (The Economist, 28 February 2009, p. 37, italics added). Likewise, French banks that received state support had to increase domestic lending by 3-4 per cent annually, while Dutch bank ING announced that it would lend US$ 32 billion to Dutch borrowers in return for government assistance (World Bank, 2009, p. 70) .
Econometric methodology
To examine whether increased information costs and banks' ability to mitigate such costs impact the cross-border transmission of a financial shock, we use the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as an exogenous event that triggered a sudden stop in cross-border lending. By comparing the average monthly lending volume (or number of loans) after the Lehman collapse to average monthly lending before the start of the crisis, we control for all timeinvariant characteristics of recipient countries that influence the level of cross-border lending (such as the institutional environment and the level of economic development), plus all timeinvariant factors that affect the lending volume of bank i to country j. This allows us to focus on testing for heterogeneous bank behaviour as a result of differences in how banks deal with information asymmetries vis-à-vis foreign borrowers. Collapsing the monthly time-series information on lending into pre-crisis and post-Lehman averages also prevents inconsistent standard errors due to auto-correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004) .
We use country-fixed effects to focus on differences across banks within countries. A key advantage of this approach is that it allows us to neatly control for changes in credit demand at the country level. In particular, we follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Schnabl (2011) who control for credit demand at the firm level by using firm-fixed effects in regressions on a dataset of firms that borrow from multiple banks. Since our dataset contains information on multiple banks lending to the same country, we can use country fixed effects to rigorously control for credit demand at the host country level (cf. Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011) . This is important because the crisis hit the real economy of countries to a different extent and with a different lag. Firms' demand for external funds to finance working capital and investments has consequently been affected to varying degrees. Summarising, our model specification is:
where subscripts i and j denote individual banks and destination countries, respectively, β' and γ' are coefficient vectors, I ij is a matrix of information variables for individual bankdestination country pairs, X i is a matrix of bank-specific control variables, φ is a vector of country-fixed effect coefficients, and η is the error term. We also estimate regressions in which we substitute the bank-specific control variables for bank-fixed effects. Since banks are active in multiple countries, we can use bank-fixed effects in addition to the country-fixed effects which allows for the most rigorous testing of the bank-country pair information variables. These regressions thus take the following form:
where ε is a vector of bank-fixed effects. We estimate all our models using OLS except for the Sudden stop regressions where we use a logit model. Standard errors are robust and clustered by bank. Tables 2 and 3 present the results from our baseline regressions. Table 2 first shows regressions based on the full dataset for our three dependent variables: Volume, Sudden stop, and Numbers. These regressions include either bank-specific controls or bank-fixed effects.
Empirical results

Baseline regression results
For reasons of brevity we do not show the control variables for the last two dependent variables (the statistical and economic significance of the related coefficients is very similar to those reported for Volume). In Table 3 we then split the sample into lending to advanced countries and emerging markets. Here, we only present the results of our bank-fixed effects' regressions. We explain between 20 and 30 per cent of the variation in banks' post-Lehman retrenchment from specific countries.
It appears that cross-border lending to countries in which a bank owns a Subsidiary is more stable. The first two columns of Table 2 show that lending to countries with a Subsidiary was reduced significantly less, in terms of volume and number of loans. The probability of a very sharp decline -a Sudden stop of 75 per cent or more-is also significantly lower. However, when we add other explanatory variables to the combined regressions on the right-hand side, it turns out that the Subsidiary effect is dominated by these other variables. Table 3 shows that the Subsidiary effect is more robust in emerging markets, arguably because in these countries trustworthy 'hard' information is less readily available and a local presence may be more important. On average banks reduced the amount of lending and the number of loans to an emerging market with a subsidiary by 12 and 4 percentage points less, respectively, compared to an emerging market without a subsidiary (based on the combined bank-fixed effects' regressions in the lower panel of es or in the number of loans. Just like the Subsidiary effect, the effect is stronger in emerging markets, where it has a robustly negative impact on the probability of a sudden stop in lending. Banks that had built up a track record of syndicated lending over time turned out to be less fickle during the crisis.
Emerging markets
Information and crisis transmission -Advanced countries versus emerging markets
Finally, our control variables tell some interesting stories as well (top panel Table 2 ). We find quite strong evidence for a negative correlation between state support and cross-border lending during the crisis, in line with an increased focus on domestic lending by supported banks. Government-supported banks reduced their cross-border lending by 9 per cent more than non-supported banks. The result holds when we include a battery of other bank-specific control variables. While this seems to confirm the anecdotal evidence on a negative causal impact of financial protectionism on cross-border lending, it may also partly reflect selection bias. Weaker banks, with the most binding balance sheet constraints and the biggest need to deleverage, were also those most in need of government support. As expected, we also find that larger and better capitalised banks were relatively stable sources of credit during the crisis, whereas banks that had to increase their liquidity during the crisis were among those that retrenched the most from foreign markets. column). Table 4 shows that our results are robust to this change.
Robustness
Alternative calculations of dependent variables
Finally, we recalculate the dependent variables that measure changes in loan volumes (Volume and Sudden stop) on the basis of three different loan allocation rules. As mentioned in Section 3.1, Loan Analytics only provides information on the exact loan breakdown for about 25 per cent of all loans. So far we have used a rather simple rule to distribute the other 75 per cent of the loans over their respective syndicate members: we assumed that each lender provided the same amount of money. To minimise the risk that we introduce a significant measurement error by choosing a particular distribution rule, we recalculate our dependent variable using three alternative methods.
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The 'Alternative rule' columns show regressions where the dependent variable is calculated on the basis of a different rule. The information from Loan Analytics shows that about 50 per cent of a typical loan is distributed to participants (junior banks), whereas the other half is retained by loan arrangers (senior banks). We therefore allocate half of each loan to the arrangers and half to the participants and further subdivide these loan portions within the arranger and participant groups on an equal basis. This alternative calculation leaves our main results unchanged.
Next, we go one step further and use the 25 per cent of our sample for which we have full information to estimate a model in which the loan amount of individual lenders is the dependent variable. As explanatory variables we use the average loan amount (total loan amount divided by the number of lenders in the syndicate), a dummy that indicates whether a lender is an arranger or a participant, an interaction term between this arranger dummy and a variable that measures whether the borrower is a repeat borrower or not, an interaction term between the arranger dummy and a post-Lehman time dummy, and a set of bank and country dummies.
11 Simply using the 25 per cent of the loan population for which we have breakdown information would introduce a measurement error in the dependent variables Volume and Sudden stop. When constructing the lending flows from bank i to country j we would need to assume that the loan amount is zero for the loan shares that are missing, which obviously is incorrect. Because the availability of loan allocation information is more or less random, this problem would extend to all bank-country pairs. 
Table 4 Information and crisis transmission -Robustness checks
Volume
Sudden stop Numbers
This table shows the results of various robustness tests for our baseline regressions to explain the decline in cross-border lending from bank i to destination country j after the Lehman Brothers default. Table A3 The regressions in Tables 2 and 3 Table 4 show again that our results are very robust.
rule where each lender receives just one per cent of the loan ount with the exception of one randomly chosen lender that receives the rest of the loan e distribution' columns in Table 4 ). Even in this case our results continue to hold, Domestic banks and Experience coefficients are estimated imprecisely in the and Sudden stop regressions, respectively. This is due to the fact that this 'extreme' ost noise in the approximation of the 'true' loan ounts. When we apply the various rules to the 25 per cent of our sample for which we lly know the loan distribution, we find that the average deviation from the true loan ount is 29 per cent for the simple rule, 33 per cent for the alternative rule, 47 per cent for odel-based allocation, and 90 per cent for the extreme distribution rule.
, Table 4 shows that our results are robust to changes in the calculation method for our rong negative effect of distance on lending s of loan volume and number of loans and a positive impact on the probability Sudden stop. In addition, the level of cooperation with domestic banks continues to pact on cross-border lending stability. Finally, we continue to find that xperience in lending to particular countries were less likely to pletely stop lending to these countries in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse.
t evidence for a negative relationship between ing stability. However, the collection and ission of borrower information from the destination country to a bank's headquarters ay also be impaired by cultural and institutional differences between the home and ce, notwithstanding the large geographical distance involved, ay have kept up their syndicated lending to Mexican firms quite well during and historical ties between both countries made Spanish banks ase in dealing with Mexican clients than with borrowers in, say, Turkey (which is ltural terms). Similarly, banks may feel more confident -in particular during a crisis -when lending to firms in countries where the institutional and legal environment resembles that in their home country.
To look into the relative importance of geographical, cultural, and institutional distance in more detail, we analyse the impact of a number of non-geographical distance measures on lending stability. These include a dummy variable that indicates whether the bank's home country and the destination country share a common language, a dummy that indicates whether both countries share colonial links, a variable that measures the absolute difference between both countries in the Doing Business credit information index (which measures rules affecting the scope, access and quality of credit information), and a dummy that indicates whether the origin of the legal system of both countries differs. This table shows estimations to explain, using different distance measures, the decline in cross-border lending from bank i to destination country j after the Lehman Brothers default. The dependent variable is Sudden stop . Table A3 in the Appendix contains definitions of all variables. Regressions include bank-fixed effects and destination country-fixed effects. We use a logit model with standard errors that are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank. Coefficients are marginal effects. Robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, **, * correspond to the one, five and ten per cent level of significance, respectively.
In Table 5 we add these alternative distance measures one-by-one to our baseline regression; in each case first alone, and then together, with our geographical distance measure to see how they affect the coefficient of the latter. We only show the regressions for the dependent variable Sudden stop. Results for Amount and Numbers are very similar and available upon request. It becomes clear that geographical distance is a very robust determinant of lending stability. The variable is only 'challenged' by the dummy that measures whether the bank's home country and the destination country share a common language. This cultural proxy has a significant negative effect on the probability of a Sudden stop: lending flows between culturally similar countries are more resilient. However, even when we add this variable together with Distance, the coefficient of the latter stays statistically highly significant and displays only a marginal reduction in economic significance.
Finally, the institutional distance variables Colonial links, Credit info and Legal difference do not have a strong independent impact on lending stability and hardly affect the coefficient of Distance in a bilateral 'horse race'. Note that the coefficient for Legal difference is significant at the 10 per cent level and has the right sign: the probability of a Sudden stop in lending is higher in case the bank's home country and the destination country have different legal origins. In summary, we conclude that geographical distance is what matters for lending stability: during a crisis banks continue to lend more to borrowers that are physically closer.
Extensions
Borrower heterogeneity
The extent to which banks reduced their cross-border lending during the crisis may not only have differed across destination countries, but also across borrower groups within these countries. In this sub-section we first analyse whether there has been a differentiated crisis impact on cross-border lending to first-time borrowers and to repeat borrowers. We define first-time borrowers as borrowers that had never borrowed from bank i before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, whereas repeat borrowers are borrowers to whom bank i had lent at least once. Successful prior loans and the associated borrower reputation can attenuate information asymmetries between lenders and their borrower (Diamond, 1991 and Gorton and Pennachi, 1995) . De Haas and Van Horen (2010) find that arrangers of syndicated loans need to retain less in the case of loans to repeat borrowers and that retention rates for loans to such borrowers needed to increase less during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. If loans to repeat borrowers are plagued by fewer agency problems, we expect that the information variables we use in our analysis will have less of an impact on the reduction in cross-border lending to such borrowers. Table A3 in the Appendix contains definitions of all variables. The first set of regressions is estimated on the basis of a dataset that contains two observations for each bank i-country j pair: one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a sudden stop in lending from bank i to first-time borrowers in country j and one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a sudden stop in lending from bank i to repeat borrowers in country j. First-time borrowers are borrowers that had never borrowed from bank i before the collapse of Lehman Brothers whereas repeat borrowers are borrowers to whom bank i had lent at least once. The second set of regressions is also estimated on the basis of a dataset that contains two observations for each bank i-country j pair: one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a sudden stop in lending from bank i to banks in country j and one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a sudden stop in lending from bank i to non-bank borrowers in country j. The interaction variables interact the main independent variables with the dummy that identifies first-time borrowers (first set of regressions) or non-bank borrowers (second set). All regressions include country fixed effects and bank fixed effects that are allowed to vary between repeat vs. first-time borrowers and between bank vs. non-bank borrowers, respectively. We use a logit model where standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank. Coefficients are marginal effects. Robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, **, * correspond to the one, five and ten percent level of significance, respectively.
The left-hand side of Table 6 shows estimation results for a regression model that allows for a differential impact of our information variables on repeat and first-time borrowers. As in Table 5 the dependent variable is Sudden stop.
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The regressions are estimated on the basis of a dataset that contains two observations for each bank i-country j pair: one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a Sudden stop in lending from bank i to first-time borrowers in country j, and one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a Sudden stop in lending from bank i to repeat borrowers in country j. The interaction terms interact the main independent variables with the dummy that identifies first-time borrowers.
The first line confirms our earlier results: the probability of a Sudden stop is lower in case a bank has a subsidiary in a country, is geographically closer to the country, is well-integrated into a network of domestic borrowers and has previous experience in the country. The second line indicates that these effects are similar for first-time and repeat borrowers with the exception of Experience, which is particularly important for lending to first-time borrowers.
12 The results are again similar when using the other two dependent variables (results available upon request).
Finally, the third line shows that, as expected, the probability of a Sudden stop was significantly higher for lending flows to first-time borrowers (all else equal).
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The right-hand side of Table 6 shows similar regressions for cross-border lending flows to bank versus non-bank borrowers. Also in this case the dataset contains two observations for each bank i-country j pair: one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a Sudden stop in lending from bank i to banks in country j, and one where the dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether there was a Sudden stop in lending from bank i to non-bank borrowers in country j.
14 The interaction terms interact the main independent variables with the dummy that identifies non-bank borrowers.
Compared to other sectors, banks are intrinsically difficult to screen and monitor since they themselves are delegated monitors of a portfolio of sub-projects (Diamond, 1984) . Agency problems in inter-bank lending are difficult to resolve as there is not one (physical) project or factory that a potential lender can visit and inspect. Due diligence of a bank borrower is a more onerous process that deals with assessing the bank's risk and operational systems as well as the quality of a sample of the loan book. Banks' high leverage exacerbates these agency problems (Morgan, 2002) . During the crisis short-term inter-bank lending virtually dried up in many countries and the extreme rise in uncertainty and information asymmetries in lending between banks also had repercussions for longer-term lending between banks.
The results in Table 6 indicate that none of the mechanisms that banks successfully used to limit information costs during the crisis -country-specific experience, relationships with domestic co-lenders, and (to a lesser extent) a local subsidiary -helped to contain the crunch in inter-bank cross-border syndicated bank lending. Agency problems and mistrust in the inter-bank market were simply too large for banks to mitigate them in any meaningful way.
The third line shows that the probability of a Sudden stop in cross-border lending was, as expected, significantly larger for banks than for non-banks. 13 The finding that access to borrower information is important for both lending to first-time and to repeat borrowers shows that our baseline results do not merely reflect a crisis-related shift to repeat borrowers (who are likely to be concentrated in countries where a bank owns a subsidiary, that are close, and where the bank has cooperated with domestic banks and has built up lending experience more generally). 14 Because not all banks lend to both groups in each country in the pre-crisis period, the number of observations in this regression is less than twice the number of observations in the baseline regression in Table 2 .
Arrangers versus participants
A typical syndicate consists of two tiers: arrangers and participants. The arrangers comprise the senior tier and negotiate the lending terms with the borrower, who gives the arrangers a mandate to structure and market the loan. Arrangers then allocate a substantial part of the loan to a junior tier, the participants, who assume a more passive role. Participants are usually not actively involved in the organisation of the loan or in the screening and monitoring of the borrower. Mechanisms to deal with information problems may therefore have been particularly important for arrangers and our results may consequently be driven by banks that typically act in an arranger role.
To see whether this is the case, we rerun our baseline regressions while including a variable
Arranger that measures for each bank the percentage of pre-crisis loans in which it acted as a mandated lead arranger or book runner, rather than as a participant. We interact our main information variables -Distance, Subsidiary, Domestic banks, and Experience -with
Arranger. We find no significant differences between both tiers of syndicate members. This suggests that even for banks that more or less passively buy into a syndicated loan, it matters whether it has lending experience in a country, whether the country is distant or not, whether it has been lending together with domestic banks, and whether -in the case of emerging markets -it owns a subsidiary in that country.
Impact on loan maturity and spreads
The sudden stop in cross-border bank lending may not only have manifested itself in a reduced availability of credit, but also in higher lending rates and/or a reduction in maturities for those loans that did go ahead. Lending rates may have gone up especially where banks found it difficult to assess the increase in risks in the wake of the Lehman Brothers collapse.
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Likewise, banks may have shortened maturities in particular in countries where they experienced more difficulties in stepping up their screening efforts. Theory suggests that lending at short maturities may reduce moral hazard and other debt-related agency problems (Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, 1980; Rey and Stiglitz, 1993) .
To look into this, we estimate regressions where our dependent variables are the change in the average Spread charged by bank i to borrowers in country j and the change in the average Maturity of loans by bank i to country j, respectively. Spread measures the spread over Libor 15 Lending rate increases will nevertheless be constrained by concerns about moral hazard. Note that our country-fixed effects control for the change in country risk, which allows us to focus on how different banks behave differently within a certain country.
(or other relevant reference rate). We find no robust evidence of an impact of any of our information variables on the average change in maturity or spreads. One interesting and clear exception is the positive impact of Experience on spreads, both in emerging markets and developed countries (significant at the 5 per cent level in both sub-sample regressions and at the 1 per cent level in a regression for all countries). Banks with more lending experience in a country are more inclined to continue to lend but this commitment -and the reduction in competitive pressures due to other lenders leaving the market -comes at the cost of higher lending rates.
Cross-border versus domestic syndicated lending
Because international banks were more inclined to keep lending to some countries than to others, we document substantial variation in the severity of the sudden stop after the collapse of Lehman Brothers (Figure 1) . While a full analysis of the impact of the sudden stop on destination countries is beyond the scope of this paper, Figure 2 illustrates that most countries were unable to offset the decline in cross-border lending through increasing domestic syndicated lending. The left-hand pane shows all 60 destination countries included in our dataset whereas the right-hand pane zooms in on those countries that experienced a decline in both cross-border and total syndicated lending. Countries that experienced a percentage change in domestic lending that was exactly equal to the percentage change in cross-border lending are on the 45º line. Countries where domestic lending shrank faster (slower) than cross-border lending are to the right (left) of this line. 
Cross-border lending
The left-hand pane shows that there were only a few countries -India, China, Japan -where increased lending by (often state-owned) banks more than compensated for the severe drop in cross-border inflows. The right-hand pane shows that most countries experienced a decline in total syndicated lending very similar to the decline in cross-border syndicated lending (observations on the 45º line). Domestic lending was unable to cushion much of the decline in credit from abroad. Only a few countries -Germany, South Africa, Taiwan -partially counterbalanced reduced inflows with increased domestic lending. This imperfect substitutability between cross-border and domestic syndicated loans implies that the results we document in this paper are likely to have had severe consequences for the total lending supply in the destination countries.
Conclusion
We use a detailed dataset on cross-border bank lending to analyse to what extent mechanisms to mitigate information costs enable banks to limit their decrease in cross-border lending during a crisis. We employ country-and bank-fixed effects to rigorously control for changes in credit demand and other confounding factors, instead focusing on the impact of information variables on the stability of lending by specific banks to borrowers in specific countries. In line with our theoretical priors, we find a strong and robust negative effect of geographical distance on lending stability, both in lending to advanced and to emerging markets. Distant borrowers are not only more difficult to screen and monitor in general, but their creditworthiness is also particularly difficult to assess during a crisis.
An effective way for banks to (partially) offset the impact of distance is to cooperate with domestic banks. We find that during the global financial crisis banks were better able to keep lending to countries in which they are well integrated into a network of domestic co-lenders.
Likewise, banks also remained more committed to lend to countries in which they had gained experience by building relationships with (repeat) borrowers. Banks that have built up a track-record of syndicated lending to a particular country turn out to be less fickle during a crisis. Track records matter on the side of borrowers too: the sudden stop was particularly severe in the case of lending flows to first-time borrowers. Finally, we find that in the case of cross-border lending to emerging markets, where trustworthy 'hard' information -such as accounting reports -may be less readily available, the presence of a local subsidiary also stabilises cross-border lending.
To sum up, our findings paint a more nuanced picture than the black-and-white dichotomy of transaction-based lending by large banks versus relationship lending by small banks. We
show that even in a sample of the largest international banks that provide loans to large companies, access to 'soft' information -gathered through repeat lending and interaction with domestic banks -is important.
Our results clearly bear on the policy debate on financial globalisation and in particular on whether and how countries should integrate their banking systems with global financial markets. A key feature of cross-border lending that has been a focus of debate, and further underlined by the recent crisis, is its unstable character (for instance compared to lending by domestic banks or foreign bank subsidiaries). Our results provide some first answers to the question of when cross-border lending is particularly volatile and when it is not. Perhaps somewhat controversially, we find that banks that are further away from their customers are less reliable funding sources during a crisis. Clearly, policy-makers not only need to make a decision on whether to open up their banking system but also to whom.
A second finding is that international banks with a local presence on the ground may be more stable providers of credit. For emerging markets that are considering to open up their banking system this implies that stimulating banks to 'set up shop' may kill two birds with one stone.
Not only do foreign bank subsidiaries provide for a relatively stable credit source themselves, but their presence may also stabilise the cross-border component of bank lending. Rather than imposing capital controls to reduce the volatility of cross-border lending, countries may thus contemplate allowing international banks to also set up a local affiliate.
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